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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





                                              Appellant
   v.
PEOPLE'S BANK;
RICHARD J. BOUDREAU, ESQ., (MASS);
BOUDREAU & ASSOCIATES, LLC
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-05882)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on November 27, 2006
Before: RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges,
and PRATTER*, District Judge
(Filed:  December 21, 2006)
__________________
       * Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, Judge of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Adam Goodmann appeals the dismissal by the District Court of
New Jersey of claims Goodmann brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601. 
Goodmann sued Defendants-Appellees People’s Bank, Richard J. Boudreau, and
Boudreau & Associates, LLC, after an erroneous charge was wrongfully placed on his
credit card and Appellees took adverse action against Goodmann (including cancelling
his credit card) without following appropriate procedures.  (Richard J. Boudreau and
Boudreau & Associates, LLC, are debt collectors.)  In his complaint, Goodmann sought
from People’s Bank $879.69 and “all reasonable Court costs and attorney fees associated”
with his actions against the Bank.  Goodmann also sought from the debt collectors
“$1,000 for each violation plus all reasonable Court costs and attorney fees associated
with these Actions.” 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, People’s Bank
submitted to Goodmann in writing an Offer of Judgment in the amount of $900.  See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (“At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to
3be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in
the offer, with costs then accrued. . . . An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn
. . . .”).  People’s Bank “offer[ed] to allow judgment to be taken against [it] in the amount
of $900.00 . . . plus your actual costs for service of the summons and complaint upon the
defendant.  This sum is inclusive of damages, costs, and attorneys’s fees.”  The debt
collectors made a similar offer in the amount of $1,000.  They “offer[ed] to allow
judgment to be taken against [them], jointly and severally, in the amount of $1000.00 . . .
plus your actual costs for the filing fee of the complaint in the U.S. District Court and
your actual costs for service of the summons and complaint against these defendants. 
This sum is inclusive of damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.”  
Goodmann did not respond to either written offer.  Appellees made a motion
before the District Court that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming that their offer to Goodmann of complete
relief had been denied and that such denial mooted the case.  The case was dismissed and
Goodmann timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Court has jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C.
 § 1291.  Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
appropriate when the District Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).  The District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the
controversy has become moot.  Moreover, “under traditional mootness principles, an offer
4for the entirety of a plaintiff’s claim will generally moot the claim.”  Weiss v. Regal
Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir. 2004).
Goodmann claims that the offer presented by Appellees did not an include an
amount sufficient to moot his entire case.  With regard to the debt collectors, Goodmann’s
complaint alleged “at least five separate statutory violations” which he believed the
collectors had committed as a result of their pursuit of the erroneous charge, and
Goodmann claims he is entitled to $1,000 for each violation.  In his brief to the Court,
Goodmann also claims that in connection with his actions against the Appellees he has
incurred damages in the form of “mailing costs, facsimile costs, copy costs, parking costs,
telephone costs, and deposition costs e.g. appearance fees and transcript fees.”  He also
cites the costs of formal pleadings with the District Court, claiming that he incurred costs
of $13.65 per mailing to the District Court and $4 per mailing to Appellees’ counsel (for
an unspecified total).  Such costs, Goodmann alleges, raise the amount of his potential
judgment above $1,000 and $900 respectively, and thus his claims should not have been
dismissed by Appellees’ offers.  His original complaint, however, only sought his
statutory damages and “reasonable Court costs.”
With regard to the Bank’s liability, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 states that a bank who has
failed to comply with the Truth in Lending Act is liable “in the case of an individual
action [for] twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the transaction.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i).  Successful plaintiffs may seek to recover costs and “a
reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”  15 U.S.C. § 1640.  (Goodmann, an
5attorney proceeding pro se, is not entitled to attorney’s fees.  Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432
(1991).)  
We disagree with Goodmann’s assessment of how much he is owed under the
applicable statutes.  Twice the amount of the finance charges (including lost “cashback
points”) was $879.69.  The amount offered by the Bank was $900.  The Bank’s offer
exceeded the statutory damages potentially available under 15 U.S.C. § 1640.   
With regard to the debt collectors’ liability, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k states that a debt
collector who fails to comply with the Act is liable for “any actual damage sustained by
such person as a result of such failure,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1) and “in the case of any
action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not
exceeding $1,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).  Successful plaintiffs may seek to
recover the costs of the action, as well as a reasonable attorney’s fee.  15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(3).  (Again, Goodmann is an attorney proceeding pro se, and thus is not
entitled to attorneys fees.  Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991).)
Goodmann alleges that he is entitled to more than $1,000 from the debt collectors
because he has alleged five separate statutory violations.  We agree with Appellees that
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) is best read as limiting statutory damages to $1,000 per
successful court action.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (“[A]ny debt collector who fails to
comply with any provision of this title . . . is liable to such person in an amount equal to
the sum of . . . in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the
court may allow, but not exceeding $ 1,000.”); see also Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk,
6Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“Congress certainly knows how to
write statutes that make each separate violation subject to a separate penalty, or even that
make each separate day of a violation a separate offense subject to a separate penalty. 
There is no such intimation, however, anywhere in the actual language of 15 U.S.C. §
1692k(a)(2)(A), elsewhere in the act, or in any of the surrounding legislative history.”)
(citations omitted); Harper v. Better Bus. Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir.
1992)  (“The FDCPA does not on its face authorize additional statutory damages of
$1,000 per violation of the statute, of $1,000 per improper communication, or of $1,000
per alleged debt.  If Congress had intended such limitations, it could have used that
terminology.”).  In this action, the maximum statutory award the District Court could
have granted was $1,000 and the debt collectors offered that amount.
As Appellees offered $900 and $1,000 respectively, the only remaining question is
whether the terms of their offers included the “reasonable Court costs” sought by
Goodmann under the applicable statutes.  The debt collectors offered to pay the “actual
costs for the filing fee of the complaint in the U.S. District Court and [the] actual costs for
service of the summons and complaint against these defendants.”  The Bank offered to
pay “actual costs for service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant.”  The
offers promised to pay the recoverable costs sought by Goodmann in his complaint. 
It is clear that the offers presented by the Appellees encompassed the entirety of
the costs of the action sought by Goodmann.  The Appellees presented “an offer for the
entirety of a plaintiff’s claim,” Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.
    1 Goodmann also claims on appeal that Appellees’ Answer to the Complaint was
inappropriately vague and conclusory; for the reasons provided by the District Court this
claim is without merit. 
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2004), and Goodmann’s refusal (by not responding within 10 days) deprived the District
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.1
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the offer presented to Goodmann was an offer for
the entirety of his claims, and accordingly his refusal mooted his claim.  The order of the
District Court will be AFFIRMED.
__________________
